Opportunities Abound in the Chinese Civil Aviation Marketplace

January 4, 2024 by Leave a comment

The Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) has published a year-end report examining the traffic numbers for 2023, and making predictions for 2024.

The report shows that the Chinese commercial aviation market is robust and growing, having surpassed its 2019 (pre-Covid) numbers.

In the Report, CAAC touted its efforts to reform the supply chain for aviation. ASA has been working with China on this project since before Covid, with CAAC having issued formal recognition of the ASA-100 standard (in the CAAC’s information bulletin: IB-FS-MAT-001 R1 (2020)). This CAAC-ASA partnership was meant to protect the integrity of the international supply chain that supports the Chinese market.

CAAC also stressed its focus on safety management (an example of which can be seen in their new Part 145 regulations, which included an SMS requirement).

Air traffic highlights from the CAAC report support the conclusion that this is a growing market:

  • 2023 domestic commercial flight volumes exceeded 2019 (pre-Covid) volumes by 1.5%, and are expected to keep growing.
  • International passenger flights recover from less than 500 flights per week at the beginning of the year to more than 4,600 flights per week by the end. 
  • Passenger traffic between China and Europe has recovered to more than 60% of the pre-Covid level.
  • Regular direct flights between China and the United States have increased to 63 flights per week.
  • In 2023, Chinese civil aviation transported 620 million passengers.
  • In 2024, CAAC predicts that Chinese civil aviation will transport 630 million passengers on domestic routes, and will increase international flights to 6000 per week by the end of 2024.

From the CAAC Report, it appears that the Chinese aviation market has grown and will continue to grow. This could be an excellent opportunity for ASA members to increase their presence in China. ASA continues to maintain its relationship with CAAC and is proud to play a role in the CAAC aviation safety plans. 

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Should a Receiving Inspector Wear Gloves?

December 13, 2021 by Leave a comment

I recently received a question about when, and if, a receiving inspector should wear gloves.  The questioner noted that in his facility, gloves appear to slow the receiving inspection process, so there is a potential negative to gloves. 

ASA-100 (rev. 5.0) and FAA AC 00-56B both requires an accredited distributor to have receiving inspection procedures, but neither mentions gloves.  So neither of these provides us with guidance about the glove question.

In the absence of formal guidance, a business must examine the likely the hazards and weigh the risks associated with both glove use and glove absence.  We’ve been told that gloves can slow down receiving inspection, so the question is whether the potential benefits of gloves outweigh the effect on effectiveness and efficiency, and any other identified risks.

There are at least two reasons for receiving inspectors to wear gloves: to protect the receiving inspector and to protect the articles being inspected.

Protecting the Inspector

The first reasons for receiving inspectors to wear gloves is to protect the receiving inspector’s hands from harm.  If the surfaces or materials being inspected could harm the inspector’s hands, then appropriate gloves should be worn. 

The nature of “appropriate gloves” varies with the nature of the hazard that the receiving inspector reasonably faces, so it is important to perform a hazard identification and risk assessment process to identify what sort of protection might be necessary.

What is appropriate can vary.  If the harm could come from chemicals, like battery electrolytes, then gloves designed to protect the hands from the chemicals should be worn.  If the harm could come from sharp surfaces that might cut the hands, then the gloves may need to be heavy enough to provide protection from physical harm caused by the sharp surfaces.  Temperature could also be a hazard: for example, a receiving inspector working with cryogenic liquids, like liquid oxygen, may need gloves to protect against the low temperature. 

Likewise, the exterior coating of aircraft parts should be considered, because some parts bear a coating that can be dangerous.  For example, chromate coatings can be carcinogenic.

It is important to review safety data sheets and other manufacturer’s recommendations when assessing the need for protective gloves.  Remember, there are plenty of materials that should only be handled with gloves, but if the receiving inspector will only handle the packaging and not the material then the gloves may not be necessary for the receiving inspector. 

Finally, be sure to examine actual hazards in the receiving inspection area, especially unusual hazards that are location-specific or business-specific.  In a very small facility where welding must take place adjacent to the receiving inspection station, a prudent business may require that the receiving inspector wear protective clothing to protect against sparks and slag from the welding operation.

Protecting the Parts

The second reason for receiving inspectors to wear gloves is to protect the articles that are being received and inspected. 

Gloves can be part of the strategy for protecting avionics or other sensitive equipment from electro-static discharge (ESD); but gloves are not the only way to approach ESD control.

Gloves are also normal for handling certain raw materials, like those used in composite repairs.  The purpose of the gloves in this case is to prevent contamination of the materials.

In some cases, coatings on parts could be adversely affected by the oils on the skin.  This is a corollary to the earlier warning about coatings adversely affecting the receiving inspector; the receiving inspector could also adversely affect the coating.  Engine parts – especially hot-section engine parts – would be one type of part that might have specialized coatings (including subsurface coatings that could be revealed during a stripping process) that could be affected by oils from the skin.

In other cases, articles can be impaired by improper handling.  Instructions for hot-formed acrylics typically call out gloves to prevent finger marks on the acrylic; whether this is necessary for a specific receiving inspection process depends on the hazards that may reasonably arise during the process.

To assess whether receiving inspectors should wear gloves is to protect the articles, the business should examine the range of articles that are typically received, identify any feature of those articles that might make then susceptible to damage or degradation as a consequence of non-gloved handling. If there are any such features, then the potential for damage or degradation can be treated as a hazard, and analyzed using risk assessment. The use of gloves can be considered as one candidate for risk mitigation, but th assessor should be open to other types of risk mitigation.

Conclusion

There is no explicit requirement for receiving inspectors to wear gloves. This means that the decision on mandating gloves within a business should be made based on risk mitigation criteria.

Ultimately, if your analysis shows that there are no hazard risks that need to be mitigated, or if it shows that there are better ways to mitigate those risks than the use of gloves, then mandating gloves might not be the right way to go. If, on the other hand, (1) there are identified hazards, (2) your analysis suggests that the risks posed by those hazards need to be mitigated, and (3) the use of gloves might reasonably mitigate those risks, then the use of gloves should be weighed against glove-related drawbacks, like loss of efficiency or effectiveness.

Assuming that the use of gloves might reasonably respond to identified risks in need of mitigation, then you should examine the potential drawbacks. If glove-related drawbacks, like loss of efficiency or effectiveness, seem to outweigh the benefits of using gloves, then it might be appropriate to try to identify other mechanisms for mitigating the identified hazards. If glove-related drawbacks, like loss of efficiency or effectiveness, are outweighed by the benefits of using gloves, then it might be appropriate to mandate gloves for the affected workers.

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China Approves ASA-100

September 15, 2020 by 1 Comment

The Aviation Suppliers Association is pleased to announce that the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) has approved the ASA-100 Quality System Standard for use under Chinese law.

Under CAAC guidance, Chinese air carriers who purchase parts from distributors need to ensure that the distributor has been appraised and accredited by one of the recognized industry organizations. AC-120-FS-058 Rev. 3. Recognized organizations are listed in CAAC’s IB-FS-MAT-001 (rev. 1) (see below). The first such organization was the Civil Aviation Maintenance Association of China (CAMAC). The second is now ASA (see approval letter, below.

2020-09-16-IB-FS-MAT-001-R1Download
September 15, 2020 letter from CAAC, appointing ASA as a “recognized organization” under IB-FS-MAT-001 with respect to the ASA-100 Quality System Standard

This is the culmination of a multi-year dialogue between ASA and CAAC (and CAMAC). This should alleviate one of the concerns that ASA members have raised with respect to their efforts to support Chinese Air Carriers.

USM Alert

Members have also raised concerns about recently-published CAAC standards for Chinese air carrier purchase of parts from aircraft-disassemblies and other used serviceable material. ASA has been speaking with CAAC about this issue and is developing a solution to propose to CAAC. The solution will be designed to protect the interests that CAACis trying to protect, while also providing a reasonable path that allows safe aircraft parts to be sold.

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Hazmat System (and Training) for “No-Hazmat” Distributors

July 13, 2020 by Leave a comment

Some of the companies accredited to the ASA-100 standard have struggled with the AC 00-56B requirement for a hazmat system because they have a “no-hazmat” policy (as a matter of company policy, they neither ship nor receive hazmat). This article addresses how to build a hazmat system that complies with the AC 00-56B requirement, while also meeting the limited needs of the “no-hazmat” company.

The FAA published its “Voluntary Industry Distributor Accreditation Program” in FAA AC 00-56B.  The accreditation program requires that accredited distributors have “[a] system for hazmat control and transport that meets Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR) requirements.” This is listed as one of the required quality system elements described in the advisory circular.

Each of the required quality system elements described in the advisory circular must be adequately addressed in the accredited distributor’s quality manual. This means that the accredited distributor’s hazmat control and transport “system” must be described in the quality manual. ASA has implemented this requirement in its own quality standard, ASA-100, and the implementation can be found in sections 1(E)(16) and 15.

If an accredited distributor knows that it does not ship hazmat, then it still has an obligation to meet the requirements for the hazmat control and transport system (including a “system” in the manual).

Even if the accredited distributor does not ship hazmat, there is still a risk of hazmat getting into the business’ system. In the 1990s, the FAA published Handbook Bulletins that explained that certificate holders, like repair stations, could reasonably receive unintended hazmats, based on industry shipping norms. This was later the rationale for requiring that repair stations must provide hazmat training to their personnel (14 C.F.R. 145.53(c)) and that accredited distributors must have hazmat transport and control systems under AC 00-56B.  On a more personal note, I have received many calls and emails, over the years, from ASA members and accredittees who’ve adopted “no-hazmat” policies and then received an unwanted hazmat.  This is a problem that really does occur.

ASA has taken the position that a minimum system must include appropriate training.  ASA also requires the system to be published in the quality manual.  For an accredited distributor that plans to adopt a “no-hazmat” policy, I recommend that the manual include:

  • A statement of the company policy of not receiving and/or shipping hazardous material;
  • Requirements concerning hazardous materials recognition training (to support the company policy); and
  • A process for addressing inadvertently received (or otherwise discovered) hazardous materials.

Of course, the distributor’s record-keeping program should include records of the hazardous materials recognition training.  But what about the details of that training?

When a company knows that it does not ship hazardous materials, then I feel that the training should be focused on preventing such shipments (and preventing such items from entering the system to mitigate the danger of them being pulled from stock for shipment). This means training appropriate personnel in (1) how to recognize hazardous materials, (2) the company policy of not shipping hazardous materials, and (3) what to do if hazardous materials are inadvertently received into, or discovered in, the system.

ASA has provided hazmat recognition training to the ASA community on several occasions. Most recently, we provided a live, online webinar addressing hazmat recognition in an aircraft parts environment (on April 14, 2020). That webinar was recorded and the recording is available to ASA members who need to provide training to their personnel.

When a company maintains a “no-hazmat” policy,” I have recommended that at least five classifications of personnel should receive hazmat identification training:

(1) Quality Personnel who are responsible for drafting, publishing, auditing, and managing the procedures associated with the hazmat system;
(2) Purchasing Personnel, so they will be aware of company limits and forbear from purchasing articles that would contravene those limits;
(3) Sales Personnel, so they will be aware of company limits and forbear from selling articles that would contravene those limits;
(4) Receiving Personnel, so they can recognize hazmats if they are inadvertently received, quarantine them pending appropriate disposition, and notify appropriate decision-makers within the company;
(5) Shipping Personnel, so they can recognize hazmats and forbear from shipping them in violation of company policy and/or regulatory limits.

By training these five classifications of personnel, you help to ensure that the company’s “no-hazmat” policy can be successful.

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FAA Authorizes ASA to Perform Remote Auditing under AC 00-56B

April 2, 2020 by Leave a comment

This morning, the FAA sent a letter to ASA authorizing ASA to conduct remote audits during the Covid-19 National Emergency.

This will allow ASA-100 accredited companies to obtain audits during the coronavirus crisis, and to maintain their ASA-100 and AC 00-56B accreditation. ASA will continue to play its part in supporting safety through the aviation supply chain.

What if you are accredited to AC 00-56B through an ASACB audit under one of the ISO standards: ISO9001, AS9100, AS9110 or AS9120?  No problem.  ASACB also secured permission from the FAA to perform remote audits for AC 00-56B accreditees under one of the FAA-recognized ISO9001, AS9100, AS9110 and AS9120.  ANAB, the ANSI National Accreditation Board, has already issued permission for ASACB to perform remote audits.  Both sets of permission are necessary, because both FAA and ANAB have oversight authority over ASACB.

Background

Why did ASA need to go through this formal approval process?

FAA AC 00-56 Accreditation Supports Safety

In the 1980s and 1990s, there were industry concerns that aircraft parts distribution could be a source of inadequate parts that failed to meet safety standards. The FAA investigated a number of options, such as regulating distibutors, and decided to try setting voluntary standards and permitting third party oversight as a tool for establishing safety assurance standards to be used in distribution.

The FAA published AC 00-56 (the Voluntary Industry Distributor Accreditation Program) in 1996. The program recognized Accreditation Organizations with standards that were considered acceptable to the FAA.  One of those Accreditation Organizations was ASA, which used ASA-100 (and later was also permitted to use ISO9001, AS9100, AS9110 and AS9120).  The recognized Accreditation Organizations were permitted to audit Distributors’ compliance to the published voluntary standard. This meant that the distributor had to meet the quality standard (ASA-100, ISO9001, AS9100, AS9110 or AS9120) and also all of the elements of AC )0-56.

Since the inspection of the program, the FAA has audited ASA to gauge the success of the program.  FAA program audits have confirmed that this AC 00-56B program reflects a sound safety program that makes a positive contribution to aviation safety. The AC 00-56 Program has become an important tool to assist the FAA in ensuring aviation safety.

AC 00-56 has become a globally recognized program. There are AC 00-56 accredited distributors on every continent except Antarctica. The European Union has promulgated laws requiring Part 145 certificate holders to have procedures for accepting components. EASA 145.A.42(b)(i). EASA has interpreted this to mean that 145 organizations must evaluate their suppliers (EASA AMC1 145.A.42(b)(i) Components, ¶ (b)). AC 00-56 (and ASA-100) has been recognized as an acceptable program for supplier evaluation under European supplier control laws (EASA GM3 145.A.42(b)(i) Components, ¶ (b)(4)).  ASA has been in talks with other civil aviation authorities around the world to encourage them to adopt similar provisions recognizing the value of distributor accreditation.

AC 00-56B Requires Onsite Auditing

One of the features of the AC 00-56B program is onsite auditing of the Distributors. AC 00-56B requires onsite audits in section eight, paragraphs (b) and (f). The onsite audits are performed by qualified auditors who meet the requirements of AC 00-56B, under the coordination of Accreditation Organizations recognized in AC 00-56B.

On March 13, 2020, President Trump issued a Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak. The Proclamation recognized that “[t]he spread of COVID-19 within our Nation’s communities threatens to strain our Nation’s healthcare systems.” Since that date, many United States governors and mayors have issued correlative orders: restricting travel and requiring people to remain in their residences. Covid-19 has affected the availability and advisability of travel.

Health concerns related to Covid-19 are making onsite auditing under AC 00-56B an unnecessary risk.  Travel restrictions and state “stay-at-home” orders are making it impractical to perform onsite auditing under AC 00-56B.  Remote auditing mitigates the risks posed by onsite auditing, while providing a practical response to the need to “stay-at-home” to reduce disease transmission.

While remote auditing seems like the right response, it is still not permitted under AC 00-56B.  Thus, the industry needed a formal FAA deviation or exemption that permitted remote auditing.  ASA discussed with the FAA issuing a Notice to permit industry-wide remote auditing under AC 00-56B, but the FAA was uncomfortable with this because of the need for procedures that would ensure remote auditing was successful.  ASA petitioned the FAA to permit ASA to perform remote audits, based upon ASA’s remote auditing process and remote auditing auditor training program.

Remote Auditing the Right Way

The FAA authority is subject to ASA’s internal procedures for remote auditing, which have been developed by the audit team to help ensure an equivalent level of safety assurance. These procedures include new techniques for investigation by the audit team, and identification of objective evidence of adequate compliance.

ASA has already performed auditor training to teach the audit team how to perform remote auditing successfully.  Additional staff training is now planned for the approved procedures.

The current ASA authorization from the FAA for remote auditing is valid from April 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020.  The scope is global, so that ASA can continue to provide services to clients everywhere in the world.

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Independence Day and the Importance of Systems Safety

July 3, 2019 by Leave a comment

Five years ago, FAA Deputy Director John Hickey spoke to ASA about the importance of systems safety.  He explained how we can achieve success in a system, and how the system can maintain success even in the face of change.  In the context of a safety management system, the system allows the personnel to change, without undermining the safety expectations of the system.

The elements of systems safety have come under fire, recently.

For example, you can see articles written about the need for the FAA to eliminate the designee program.  Articles suggest that it reflects an abdication of the FAA’s safety duties; but I have seen one excellent article explaining why the program works, and what we need to do in the future.

The designee program has been moving to a more systems-oriented focus for decades, now, with a emphasis on organizational designees (ODA).

The core of systems safety is creating systems that manage compliance and manage the right processes.  When those processes are incorrect, though, the result can be undesired.  Just as aviation has always sought to gather data and improve its systems, now is a time to continue to improve our systems.

ASA has always been focused on systems safety, with our emphasis on quality assurance systems implemented in accordance with ASA-100 and audited under the ASAAP program.  Distributor accreditation is a systems-based program that was audited by the FAA and found to improve safety in the industry.  Although the accreditation system is voluntary, it has become incredibly successful in the aviation industry because it is so effective in protecting the aircraft-parts-related safety of the aviation community.

On the fourth of July, American celebrates its Declaration of Independence, which was approved on July 4, 1776; but Americans point to a later document, the U.S. Constitution, as the backbone of the nation.  The U.S. Constitution became effective on July 4, 1789 – 230 years ago.  It established the system of America’s government.  Some people have posited that it might be more convenient to work outside of the Constitutional system, but that Constitutional system has worked well for America for quite a long time.  And when it has been found wanting, America has amended the Constitution rather than throwing it away.

As we approach the July 4th celebration of American independence, take a moment to think about how we can continue to improve aviation systems safety.

ASA will be examining safety systems as they apply to aircraft parts distribution at the Annual Conference in Montreal on July 14-16.

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Relevant Language from EASA’s Supplier Control Mechanisms

June 7, 2019 by Leave a comment

In an earlier post, we reported on EASA’s formal endorsement of FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 00-56 and the ASA-100 quality standard (endorsing them as an acceptable mechanism for ensuring that a supplier’s quality assurance system meets EASA expectations).

These two documents form an important part of EASA’s recent publication on supplier control mechanisms.

Some of the readers have asked me to provide the relevant language of EASA’s endorsement; they’ve noted that the entire Decision includes six annexes in addition to the actual EASA decision (and is thus too long to navigate).   In response to these inquiries, I have put together a short (five page) set of excerpts that show the supplier control implementation in the recently-published EASA AMCs and GMs.

You can find a copy of the excerpts here, at this link: ED Decision 2019-009-R – Supplier Control Mechanisms Added to European Law (excerpts).

In summary:

  • EASA AMC1 145.A.42(b)(i) provides that the procedures for the acceptance of components, standard parts and materials should include supplier evaluation procedures;
  • EASA GM2 145.A.42(b)(i) explains what a supplier is, in order to assess who must be controlled (find out more in our earlier article on supplier definition);
  • EASA GM3 145.A.42(b)(i) describes the elements that should be considered when evaluating a supplier’s quality system, and it explains that suppliers accredited to ASA-100 an AC 00-56 are acceptable;

 

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Europe Formally Recognizes AC 00-56 and ASA-100

April 30, 2019 by 1 Comment

The European Union has formally recognized FAA AC 00-56 and ASA-100 as acceptable methods for supplier evaluation.

Some of you will remember that ASA was working with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to establish protocols for aircraft parts suppliers.  EASA examined various proposals for regulating distributors, and ultimately concluded that the FAA’s Voluntary Industry Distributor Accreditation Program was an appropriate model upon which to rely.  EASA sought comments on the proposal and ultimately issued a recommendation to the European Commission.

The first part of that recommendation was acted upon in August when the European Commission issued a new rule that required repair stations (EASA 145 organization) to

“establish procedures for the acceptance of components, standard parts and materials for installation to ensure that components, standard parts and materials are in satisfactory condition and meet the applicable requirements”  EASA 145.A.42(b)(i).

The second part of that recommendation has been implemented in ED Decision 2019/009/R.  This Decision provided guidance on what it means to establish the above procedures.  First, the guidance clarifies that “[f]or the acceptance of components, standard parts and materials from suppliers, the [] procedures should include supplier evaluation procedures.” AMC1 145.A.42(b)(i) Components, section (b).   At first glance, this appears to impose a huge new obligation on repair stations to evaluate suppliers.  But EASA has offered an easy way to meet this evaluation obligation, by relying on the existing infrastructure for supplier evaluation.

GM3 145.A.42(b)(i) Components explains how to evaluate suppliers.  It explains that a suppliers’ quality system should have certain elements.  It also permits reliance on suppliers known (through external auditing) to meet four standards that are considered acceptable: AC 00-56, ASA-100, AS/EN9120 and EASO 2012.  This means that a 145 organization can rely on a supplier that was audited to such a standard, and does not have to perform its own evaluation.  The basis for endorsing each of these standards was an analysis of each standard by EASA that found that each was in compliance with the list of elements published in this GM.

I was part of the EASA rulemaking team that performed the evaluations, so I know that EASA put a lot of effort into validating that the Voluntary Industry Distributor Accreditation Program was acceptable for use in Europe.  The entire industry of accredited distributors should be proud of this recognition, because it is the result of 25 years of commitment to safety and quality.

This is great news for the community of accredited distributors.  This verifies that aircraft parts installers who rely on AC 00-56 as an element of their supplier selection process are doing the right thing.  It also confirms that the global norms for supplier evaluation are working to enhance safety.

 

Look for tomorrow’s article on how broad is the European definition of “supplier.”

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Government-Sourced Parts: Why Do We Care?

January 9, 2019 by Leave a comment

We are periodically asked about parts that have been sourced from “government” aircraft.  The concern is raised because standard industry documentation frequently recommend certifications about government sourcing (or lack thereof).  This can cause confusion, sometimes, about what represents a government source and what does not.

The root cause for this disclosure is a recognition that most aircraft are maintained to common civil standards in accordance with ICAO standards, but that the ICAO civil aircraft maintenance standards do not apply to public use aircraft.  E.g. Maintaining Public Aircraft,  FAA Advisory Circular 91.91 § 1.3 (Oct. 19, 2016) (explaining that the FAA has no statutory authority to regulate public aircraft, and the government operator therefore remains responsible for ensuring adequacy of maintenance).

Consequently, used aircraft parts that have been removed from public aircraft might not have been maintained according to the standards that are commonly used for civil aviation maintenance.

 

What is a Public Aircraft?

 

U.S. law defines a public aircraft as an aircraft used exclusively for United States Government purposes, or state government purposes.  The definition includes any aircraft exclusively leased by the government of a state or U.S. territory for at least 90 continuous days and an aircraft owned or operated by the armed forces or chartered to provide transportation or other commercial air service to the armed forces.  49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(41).  The reason that the aircraft parts community cares about public aircraft is because public aircraft do not need to be maintained to the same standards as civil aircraft.

 

What Has the FAA Recommended About Parts from Public Aircraft?

 

Because parts from public aircraft may not have been maintained to normal civil standards, the FAA has expressed concerns over them.  It is not illegal to use them, but the FAA wants their nature disclosed, so that an installer can ensure airworthiness at the time of installation (or an overhauler can ensure airworthiness at the time of overhaul).

The FAA has recommended that where a part was obtained from a non-certificated aircraft, including a public aircraft, then that fact should be so-identified by some type of documentation. Eligibility, Quality, and Identification of Aeronautical Replacement Parts, FAA Advisory Circular 20-62E, chg 1, § 10(c)(1) (Sept. 14, 2018).

 

Industry Standards for Parts from Public Use Aircraft

 

The FAA’s recommendation in AC 20-62E has been implemented through certain industry standards – most notably ASA-100.  ASA-100 recommends that the seller provide a statement disclosing whether the aircraft parts were “previously installed in a public aircraft, such as a government use aircraft or a military aircraft.”  Aviation Suppliers Association Quality System Standard, ASA-100 § 10(b)(2) (rev. 4.0).

In similar language, ATA Specification 106 recommends that used aircraft parts obtained from non-certificated aircraft be disclosed , unless the part is already accompanied by an 8130-3 that was completed as an approval for return to service.  The guidance provides examples of the sort of sources that should be disclosed, including “public use, non-U.S., and military surplus aircraft.

 

Mitigating Factor

 

A mitigating factor in all of this is that today, many public aircraft in the United States are operated and maintained as if they civil aircraft.  Through the 1980s, the United States has begun to recognize that they were not receiving adequate value on aircraft and aircraft parts that were sold at auction.  One reason was the significant expense associated with verifying airworthiness on such aircraft before they could be used for civil purposes. To remedy this, the U.S> government started maintaining its aircraft consistent with FAA (civil aviation) standards.

This eliminates the differences that caused the industry to be cautious about such public-aircraft-sourced parts.  It makes the affected public-use aircraft parts technically equivalent to comparable parts used in civil aviation.

Despite this, under current federal standards, a federal agency that sells or transfers aircraft parts to a non-federal party must provide the buyer with the following statement:

“Warning to purchasers/recipients. The aircraft parts you are purchasing or receiving in an exchange may not be in compliance with applicable Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requirements. You are solely responsible for bringing the aircraft into compliance with 14 CFR Chapter I, or other applicable standards, by obtaining all necessary FAA inspections or modifications..”

41 C.F.R. § 102-33.360(a)(2).

In addition, the purchaser must sign the a lengthy warning and disclaimer statement at the time of sale – this statement is supposed to be retained by the government seller.  Id.  These steps are meant to ensure that the U.S. government has adequately warned the buyer of the potential for non-compliance.

 

“Government Aircraft”

 

People in the industry often use the term “government aircraft.”  They come by this term honestly – the Office of Management and Budget publication OMB Circular No. A-126 (Improving the Management and Use of Government Aircraft) (May 22, 1992) uses the term “Government Aircraft” to mean the federal government’s public aircraft.  OMB Circular No. A-126. at 5(a).

The term “public aircraft,” alone, is well-understood.  But the use of the shorthand term “government aircraft” as a proxy for the concept of public aircraft has led a number of people to ask me whether the term “government aircraft” applies to airlines that are government owned. This is an obvious point of confusion.

Typically, in order for the air carrier to hold itself out to the public and offer carriage, it must be certificated under the home nation’s civil aviation rules.  This means that the air carrier’s aircraft are not (typically) flown as public aircraft. Thus, the mere fact that the air carrier is owned by the government does not imply an airworthiness question requiring a specific disclosure.

Obviously there are potential exceptions, such as where an airline wet-leases an aircraft (on an exclusive basis) to the government (this may be a public operation).

 

 

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Keeping Fasteners Safe

May 4, 2015 by Leave a comment

Standard parts – particularly fasteners – continue to be a topic that is being discussed by regulators on both sides of the Atlantic.  We’ve had private conversations with both FAA and EASA executives on this issue.

The Issue

In 2013, EASA published a Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) entitled “Defective Standard Hardware – MS21042, NAS1291 and LN9338 Self-Locking Nuts, and NAS626 Bolts.”  This European SIB highlighted defects in certain self-locking nuts, and certain bolts.  In each case, the fasteners were standard parts.  EASA recommended that those who use these fasteners should visually inspect them for surface irregularities, such as gouges or cracks, before use.  EASA also recommended testing 1% of each lot received as a means of identifying non-conformities.

In 2014, the FAA published a follow-on document (Standard Hardware, AN, MS and NAS Fasteners, FAA SAIB HQ-14-16 (April 28, 2014)) that expanded on the EASA SIB.  Further investigation had shown that the non-conformities were attributed to hydrogen embrittlement and other other latent manufacturing defects.  Although this information was not published, industry rumor suggested that the hydrogen embrittlement was the product of inadequate heat treating.

The FAA has described the defects in these fasteners as “emblematic of potential flaws in other standard hardware.”  In conversations with both FAA and EASA executives on this issue, the root cause opinions appear to be uniform – when many military specification standards were retired by the U.S military, they were then republished by civil standards organizations for continued use in civil aircraft (e.g. AIA publishes the National Aerospace Standards).  After that time, the Department of Defense no longer provided oversight to these standards.  The civil standards organizations do not certify, monitor compliance or perform surveillance of parts produced to these standards (nor of their manufacturers). The responsibility for compliance with these standards and specifications lies with their respective manufacturers – and nearly all of the time, these manufacturers are doing the right thing – they are ensuring that their standard parts meet the requirements of the applicable standards.  But events have shown that a tiny sliver of bad actors can cause unwanted problems, and some people in the government feel that this lack of oversight has left an opportunity for improper manufacturing.

How can we address this lack of oversight economically?  By considering other forms of oversight and assurance.

There is a solution.

Many fastener distributors are accredited to the ASA-100 standard.  The ASA-100 standard includes a requirement that fastener distributors perform visual inspection on fasteners, and maintain batch/lot segregation of fasteners.  This requirement establishes a second set of eyes to help ensure that fasteners are not subject to obvious flaws.

Thus, buying standard parts from ASA-100 accredited distributors helps to ensure the integrity of the fasteners that you are receiving.

The FAA and EASA are both continuing to look at this issue.

We recently met with EASA and proposed that their regulatory structure already is developing a framework for embracing a solution.  EASA published Opinion 2013-12 which included a recommendation for the updating of EASA 145.A.42.  The new language would include enhanced requirements for acceptance of components:

The organisation shall establish procedures for the acceptance of components, standard parts and materials for installation to ensure that components, standard parts and materials are in satisfactory condition and meet the applicable requirements of point (a).

In the proposed GM3 145.A.42(b)(1) that would accompany this regulatory change, Part 145 organizations would be permitted to rely on “other-party” surveillance of suppliers.  This would include reliance on the surveillance performed under the AC 00-56 program and under the ASA-100 program.  The proposed GM is published in the EASA Comment Response Document (CRD).

In light of the fact that ASA-100 already includes fastener surveillance, EASA could use this upcoming promulgation as a tool to better enhance standard fastener oversight by endorsing fastener surveillance as a required element for inclusion in the GM.  By using the distribution community as a second set of eyes, EASA and the FAA would have an inexpensive mechanism for helping to catch problems in cases where fasteners are not properly produced to the expected standards.

Distributor accreditation has been successful in addressing unapproved parts issues, by creating a knowledgeable group with appropriate quality management systems that are designed to identify those sorts of problems.  This model has already been successfully expanded to fastener issues within the ASA-100 community.  This model can also be further expanded to make use of the entire distributor accreditation community as a second set of eyes, watching for fastener issues.

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